Anti-Muslim campaigning intensifies after Abdul El-Sayed’s Michigan primary victory

A primary victory triggers a national campaign

Abdul El-Sayed’s victory in Michigan’s Democratic Senate primary has been followed by a concentrated wave of attacks focused on his Muslim identity. Republican officeholders have portrayed him as a religious or national-security threat, often without addressing his policy programme. The escalation matters beyond one race because El-Sayed could become the first Muslim elected to the US Senate if he wins in November.

The rhetoric is coinciding with broader Muslim electoral gains. Four Muslims currently serve in Congress, Ghazala Hashmi won statewide office in Virginia, and Zohran Mamdani became New York’s first Muslim mayor. Researchers interviewed by the Guardian argue that this visibility has reactivated a political strategy that treats faith itself as disqualifying, even when legitimate disputes also exist over individual candidates’ statements or positions.

Indicators move in the same direction

Several measurements described in the report point to a worsening climate. The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding’s Islamophobia Index rose from 25 in 2022 to 33 in 2025. It separately found that 63% of Muslims surveyed reported religious discrimination. A Pew survey cited by the Guardian found that 51% of American adults associated Islam more strongly than other religions with violence, with a pronounced partisan divide.

The online reaction to El-Sayed was especially rapid. The Center for the Study of Organized Hate recorded an increase of nearly 1,900% in posts naming him after the primary, from an average of 155 to more than 3,000 per day. Its wider monitoring identified 89 elected officials, 1,111 social-media posts and eight bills connected to a campaign against Islamic law, alongside a congressional caucus that had grown to 65 members.

The stakes for democratic participation

The United Nations has warned that anti-Muslim political rhetoric can feed institutional discrimination, profiling, harassment and violence. Its 2026 observance on combating Islamophobia called on governments to enforce human-rights protections and on online platforms to address religiously targeted hate. That framework does not decide the merits of American candidates, but it supplies a useful boundary: scrutiny of conduct is legitimate; collective suspicion based on faith is not.

The midterm campaign will show whether the strategy mobilises voters or produces a counterreaction among Muslims and other groups concerned with religious liberty. What to watch is whether party leaders repudiate identity-based claims, whether threats move from online speech into security incidents, and whether campaigns return to policy differences. The answer will shape both the Michigan contest and the practical ability of religious minorities to seek national office without being cast as inherently disloyal.