Council of Europe assembly panel backs using Russian state assets for Ukraine compensation

A new proposal for the principal

A committee of the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly has backed using immobilised Russian state assets to pay compensation awarded for damage caused by the war in Ukraine. The initiative, announced on September 9, argues that repurposing the assets could qualify as a lawful countermeasure under international law. It adds a distinct claims-based proposal to a crowded European debate: the European Union is separately considering how Russian reserves might support financing for Ukraine.

The distinction between the institutions matters. The Council of Europe is a 46-member human-rights organisation whose Parliamentary Assembly draws delegates from national legislatures. It is not the European Union and cannot direct assets held under EU sanctions. Its compensation architecture includes a register of war damage and an International Claims Commission intended to assess claims. The committee’s position seeks to connect future awards from that process with a potential source of payment.

The same assets face competing demands

The European Commission says more than €210 billion in Russian central-bank assets are immobilised inside the EU. Most of the principal has remained frozen, while the bloc has channelled extraordinary revenues generated from those holdings into support for Ukraine and repayment of G7-backed loans. In August, the Commission reported another €1.4 billion receipt from those revenues, bringing the accumulated windfall profits since immobilisation to €8 billion.

Using the underlying principal would be a much larger and more legally contested step than using its earnings. The Parliamentary Assembly proposal frames seizure as compensation for adjudicated damage. Other European discussions have examined converting or leveraging the assets to sustain loans and defence financing. Those purposes overlap politically but differ in legal design, beneficiaries, timing and the conditions under which funds would move.

The scale of Ukraine’s losses makes the choice consequential. Even the immobilised pool would cover only part of reconstruction and compensation needs. The EU has also established a separate €90 billion support loan for 2026 and 2027, while maintaining that Russian assets should remain immobilised until Moscow ends its aggression and pays for the damage. Governments must therefore weigh immediate financing against preserving assets for later awards.

What must happen next

The assembly committee’s declaration does not transfer any money. Implementation would require action by the jurisdictions holding the assets, a defensible legal mechanism and coordination with the claims process. The International Claims Commission must also receive enough ratifications and resources to operate at scale. The immediate question is whether EU governments will treat compensation and financial support as compatible uses of the assets or competing claims on the same principal. Until legislation or binding decisions follow, the proposal remains an influential institutional recommendation rather than an executed confiscation.